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Abstract. I examine the views of the renowned Catholic environmentalist, Thomas 
Berry, C.P., by comparing them with those of Thomas Aquinas, an author Berry fre-
quently references. I intend to show that while the two share a number of views in 
common (e.g., both hold that non-rational creatures have their own inherent good-
ness), ultimately the two diverge on many foundational issues, resulting in differing 
conclusions as to how we should regard and treat the environment. Aquinas upholds 
divine transcendence, whereas Berry regards the notion of divine transcendence to 
lead to the exploitation of creation and locates the divine in the universe itself. Berry 
accordingly thinks that we should revere all natural things, whereas Aquinas thinks we 
should revere God and creatures in God’s image. Aquinas maintains that the human 
soul is created by God and is in God’s image. He sees our rational soul as placing us 
above other natural things, and from it follows our responsibility to care for nature. 
Berry, to the contrary, sees this affirmation of discontinuity between humans and the 
rest of nature to be the root of our environmental woes, as providing a justification for 
human exploitation of nature. For Berry, humans have no special status, but are one 
member alongside others in the earth community. Rather than being created by God, 
“humans have nothing but what they receive from the universe.” By highlighting both 
the similarities and differences between these authors, I hope to contribute to the 
project of formulating a sound environmental ethics.
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Introduction
The year 2019 marks the tenth year anniversary of the death of Fr. Thomas 
Berry, C.P. (1914–2009) who is considered by many to be the most renowned 
Catholic environmentalist, aside from the recent popes.1 Berry authored 
eight books on environmentalism, some of which have been translated 
into other languages, and he also wrote quite a few essays. A recipient 
of numerous awards,2 he has been listed as one of the top fifteen “green 
religious leaders,” 3 and has an entry in the New Catholic Encyclopedia.4 There 
is a foundation that bears his name and the Forum on Religion and Ecology 
at Yale also promotes his work.5 An Emmy award winning PBS film, “The 
Journey of the Universe,” is based in large part on his environmental vision.
It behooves a Thomist to evaluate Berry’s environmental thought, 
given its widespread influence.6 And all the more so, since Daniel P. Scheid, 
in a chapter in Green Discipleship entitled “Saint Thomas Aquinas, the 
Thomistic Tradition, and the Cosmic Common Good,” singles out Berry as 
someone who has “taken up aspects of his [Aquinas’s] work or expanded 
into new directions to address ecological concerns” (Scheid 2011, 144–45). 
My goal in this essay is to examine how Berry’s environmental thought 
compares to Thomas’s, and to show that the “new directions” Berry has 
taken lead him to conclusions that are diametrically opposed to those of 
Aquinas concerning God, the universe, human nature, the relationship of 
1 Articles on Berry’s thought appear in both theological and environmental journals; see, 
for example, Ellard 2012 and Chapple 2011. 
2 See “Thomas Berry: Biography—Awards.” In Thomas Berry Foundation, access November 
12, 2018, http://thomasberry.org/life-and-thought/honorary-degrees-awards.
3 See Grist staff, 2007. “15 Green Religious Leaders,” access November 12, 2018, http://grist.
org/article/religious/. 
4 Grim 2011, 87–89.
5 See Thomas Berry Foundation: “The Forum on Religion and Ecology at Yale builds on 
the innovative work of Thomas [Berry] in the history of world religions through a joint 
degree program in religion and ecology as well as through conferences, publications, and 
a website.” In Thomas Berry Foundation, access November 12, 2018, http://thomasberry.
org/thomas-berry-foundation.
6 It is only in the last thirty years that Thomists have investigated how Aquinas’s thought 
bears on environmentalism. See George 2012, 74–75 for an overview of Thomistic litera-
ture up until 2012. For more recent Thomistic reflections see Thompson, 2012.
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humans to other earthly creatures, what is sacred and to be revered, and what 
is the story humanity needs to hear.7 I do not intend to render a judgment 
on who is correct, but simply to show that Berry diverges from Aquinas on 
issues of importance for the formulation of a sound environmental ethics.
1. Overview of Berry’s thought
Thomas Berry proposes that what has fostered the significant environmental 
destruction of his day is a mentality of regarding natural things as existing 
simply for our use. The corrective he offers consists in an alternative way of 
viewing them. He praises indigenous peoples for their sense of connection 
to the universe as to a whole of which they are but part. He regards science 
as offering modern man a “new revelation” of our interconnectedness with 
natural things, especially in regard to how our existence depends upon 
the developmental processes that have taken place in the universe over 
time. In addition to enlisting science to discredit the notion that there is 
a discontinuity between humans and non-rational beings, he also seeks to 
eradicate any radical discontinuity by attributing spiritual characteristics to 
the material universe. Accordingly, Berry advocates that we regard natural 
things with reverence, rather than as mere tools for our use. 
2. Differences of views concerning human beings 
Central to Berry’s thought is the notion that: “The materialism of science 
or the spiritualizing tendencies of religion that refuse the continuity of the 
human and all our capacities with the natural world ends up with a radical 
disassociation of the human from the universe about us” (Berry, 2006, 56). 
Aquinas in many places argues that both the human intellect and the 
human soul (of which the intellect is a power) are immaterial, and in this 
7 Space does not allow for a treatment of all of the significant differences in view. Berry’s 
notion of “Gaia” probably tops the list of untreated major differences, along with what he 
has to say about wonder and awe.
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respect, he sees there to be a discontinuity between us and the material 
universe. 8 
The above disagreement leads a further disagreement: Aquinas insists 
that a human soul cannot originate from physical causes, but must be 
created by God, whereas Berry maintains: 
Just as the human body took its shape through some fourteen billion years 
of effort on the part of the universe and through some four and a half billion 
years of earth existence, so the human psychic structure and our spirituality 
have been taking shape over all these billions of years, beginning with the 
primordial atomic particles which held within themselves the destinies of all 
that has followed, even the spiritual shaping of the human. (Berry 1988, 117)9 
And elsewhere Berry says: “Certainly humans have nothing but what they 
receive from the universe” (Berry 2006, 121).10 Aquinas, to the contrary, 
holds that the human soul is produced in being through creation: 
The rational soul is a subsistent form. Whence, it belongs properly to it both to 
be and to become. And because it cannot become from some underlying matter, 
neither corporeal (for then it would be of a corporeal nature) nor spiritual 
(for in this manner spiritual substances would be changed one into another); 
it is necessary to say that it does not become except through creation. (ST I, 
q. 90, a. 2)11
Aquinas then goes on to deny the possibility that the human soul can be 
produced by anything other than God, on the grounds that “God alone can 
create” (ST I, q. 90, a. 3). Aquinas thus would hold that in the following 
Berry is attributing to the universe what can only be attributed to God: “It 
8 See Summa Theologiae, I, q. 75, a. 2 (hereafter cited as ST) and Disputed Question de Anima, 
a. 1 and a. 14. All translations of Aquinas are my own.
9 See also, Berry 2006, 55 and Berry 2000, 25. 
10 See also, Berry 2006, 114: “If there is such a thing as human intelligence, then it has 
emerged out of the universe.” 
11 Note that in Befriending the Earth, Berry acknowledges that Western Christian thought 
maintains that human souls are specially created by God. However, he does not himself 
acknowledge it, and proceeds to state that such a belief “contributes to our sense of alien-
ation from the natural world” (Berry 1991, 115).
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is most significant for the human to experience itself as brought into being, 
sustained in being, and fulfilled through the comprehensive universe. This 
coming forth from a physical and nurturing source requires also our return 
to the universe as our final destiny” (Berry 2009b, 46). Aquinas disagrees 
with Berry’s last statement as well. Our ultimate destiny is our return to 
God, and not to the universe.12
Even in the case of other living creatures, whose souls are not created, 
Aquinas would find it objectionable to say that non-rational living things 
have nothing but what they receive from the universe, for while the souls 
or substantial forms of these beings are not the result of a special act of 
creation by God,13 the existence of these beings depends on his continual 
presence to them:
Since God is his very being through his essence, it is necessary that the created 
thing be his proper effect. … This effect, however, God causes in things, not only 
when they first begin to be, but so long as they are preserved in being; just as light 
is caused in the air by the sun so long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore, 
so long as a thing has being, so long must God be present to it, according to the 
mode of being it has. (ST I, q. 8, a. 1)
3. Consequences of the differences in view  
as to the interrelations of beings in the universe 
Although Aquinas never entertained notions such as that we are made of 
star dust, he held that humans are bodily creatures, rejecting the notion that 
the soul is the whole person.14 But again, he holds that we are not just bodily 
creatures; unlike other earthly creatures, we possess the immaterial faculties 
of intelligence and free will, rooted in our immaterial soul.15 Therein lies 
a fundamental discontinuity between humans and non-rational creatures. 
12 See ST I, q. 1, a. 7: “God is the ultimate end of man and of all other things.”
13 See ST I, q. 45, a. 8.
14 See Quaestio disputata de anima, unicus, a. 1.
15 See ST I, q. 91, aa. 1–3.
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Berry on the other hand maintains: 
One of the most fundamental sources of our pathology is our adherence to 
a discontinuity between the nonhuman and the human…. This discontinuity 
between the human and the nonhuman breaks the covenant of the universe, the 
covenant whereby every being exists and has its value in relation to the great 
universe community. (Berry 2009b, 138) 
For Berry, a consequence of the mistaken affirmation of a discontinuity between 
humans and non-rational creatures is that “it gives all the inherent values and 
all the controlling rights to the human. The only inherent value recognized in 
the nonhuman world is its utility to the human” (Berry 2009b, 138). 
The discontinuity between humans and non-rational creatures that 
Aquinas signals does not lead him to affirm that the only end to which the 
latter are ordered is human utility:
Thus, therefore, also in the parts of the universe, each and every creature is for 
the sake of its proper act and perfection.
Secondly, however, the less noble creatures are for the sake of the more 
noble ones, as the creatures that are below man are for the sake of man.
Further, however, individual creatures are for the sake of the perfection of 
the whole universe.
Further, moreover, the whole universe, with its individual parts, are ordered 
to God as to an end, insofar as divine goodness is represented in them by means 
of a certain imitation, to the glory of God; although rational creatures have God 
as their end in a certain special mode beyond this, whom they can attain by 
their own operation, by knowing and loving [him]. And thus it is manifest that 
divine goodness is the end of all corporeal beings. (ST I, q. 65, a. 2)
Berry himself approvingly notes that Aquinas holds that non-rational 
creatures have their own inherent goodness.16 Berry also accurately notes 
that Aquinas maintains17 that non-rational creatures and humans are parts 
16 See Berry, 1988, 81: “Saint Thomas dedicated his efforts in great part to defending the 
reality and goodness and efficacy intrinsic to the natural world.” 
17 See Berry 1991, 17: “As St. Thomas Aquinas…says in Part I, Question 47, Article One, of 
the Summa Theologica, the reason there are so many different things in the world is be-
cause God cannot … communicate God’s self totally to any one being, and so creates this 
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ordered to the perfection of the whole universe, a view he himself shares.18 
Aquinas does maintain, however, that non-rational creatures contribute to 
the perfection of the universe more by serving us than by simply continuing 
to exist and act. He reasons that there is no conflict between a lower part 
being ordered to the perfection of the whole and to serving a higher part:
All of the parts are thus ordered to the perfection of the whole insofar as one 
serves another. As in the human body, it is apparent that the lungs belong 
to the perfection of the body because they serve the heart: whence it is not 
contrary for the lungs to be for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the 
whole animal. And similarly it is not contrary for other natures to exist for the 
sake of intellectual beings and for the sake of the perfection of the universe: for 
if those things which the perfection of the intellectual substance require were 
lacking, the universe would not be complete. (ScG III, c. 112)19
Aquinas thus disagrees with Berry who maintains that: “The ecological 
community is not subordinate to the human community” (Berry 2000, 105). 
Also, while Berry accurately quotes Aquinas as holding that: “The order 
of the universe is the ultimate and noblest perfection of things” (Berry 
2000, 77), he fails to note that Aquinas also holds that: “The universe is 
more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature extensively and 
diffusively. But intensively and collectively the likeness of divine perfection 
is found rather in the intellectual creature, who is capable of holding the 
highest good” (ST I, q. 93, a. 2, ad 3). Indeed Aquinas holds that “the good 
array of beings so that the perfection lacking in one would be supplied by the other, and 
the total universe of things would manifest and participate in the divine more than any 
single being.”
18 See Berry 2006, 41: “We might think of ourselves as recovering from the pervasive attitude 
of Western civilization, which designates the human as a superior mode of being and use 
as our primary relation with the world about us. We have only begun to realize that we are, 
precisely in our human mode of being, a single if also immensely significant component 
in the great community of existence.” 
19 Berry maintains that: “The second cause [of humans being a destructive force on the 
planet] is our sense of Earth as primarily a natural resource for the unlimited use of hu-
mans” (Berry 2009b, 166). To say that the earth is primarily a resource for humans is not 
the same thing as to say that it is a resource to be used in any manner we please.
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of the grace belonging to one individual is greater than the good of nature 
belonging to the entire universe” (ST I–II, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2).20
Aquinas does sometimes speak as if non-rational beings serve a merely 
instrumental function in the universe.21 However, the reason that he does 
not speak of us being responsible for taking care of these beings is because 
he is unaware that we can play any significant role in safeguarding the order 
of nature. He has no idea that we could cause the extinction of a species or 
disrupt nature in other major ways and he also does not think that human 
beings have sufficient intelligence to oversee material creation. Aquinas 
explicitly affirms that care of material creation rightly falls to intelligent 
beings and he attributes this role to the angels. 22 Thus, were Aquinas to 
realize that we can disrupt nature in serious ways, and that we can make 
life-style choices and develop technologies that would diminish such 
disruption, he would maintain that we ought to do so. 
For Aquinas, then, the discontinuity between humans and non-rational 
creatures not only justifies our use of the latter in order to live and flourish 
as humans, but it also provides a reason for us to care for them insofar as 
they are parts of the universe, a universe ultimately ordered to God’s glory, 
granted he himself did not make the latter application. Berry, to the contrary, 
thinks that affirming such a discontinuity legitimates treating non-rational 
beings as mere instruments.
4. Differences in view concerning the nature of the universe 
consequent upon differences in views concerning  
the beings that constitute it
Berry frequently asserts that “the universe is a communion of subjects 
rather than a collection of objects” (Berry 2006, 17).23 He thinks that natural 
20 See also, ScG IV, c. 55: “there is nothing greater in created things than the salvation of 
rational beings.” 
21 See II Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 3 and ST I, q. 20, a. 2 and ad 3. 
22 See De Veritate, q. 5, a. 8 and ScG III, c. 78. 
23 See also, Berry 2009b, 152. See also, Berry 2000, x, xi and 16. 
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things’ inherent goodness and intrinsic spontaneity24 justifies calling them 
“subjects,” to which he contrasts “objects to be used:”25 
[I] is also important that we develop a sense of the reality and nobility of the 
natural world in itself. Saint Thomas dedicated his efforts in great part to 
defending the reality and goodness and efficacy intrinsic to the natural world. 
The natural world is not simply object, not simply usable thing, not an inert 
mode of being awaiting its destiny to be manipulated by the divine or exploited 
by the human. (Berry 1988, 81)26 
As noted earlier, Aquinas indeed thinks that non-rational creatures are not 
mere instruments, but have their own inherent goodness, a reflection of 
God’s infinite goodness. However, he still distinguishes persons (subjects) 
from things (objects).27 Thus, he would regard Berry’s distinction between 
mere instruments and subjects as false dichotomy; a non-rational creature 
is neither a person, nor a mere instrument.
The discontinuity Aquinas sees between rational and non-rational crea-
tures has as a consequence that rational creatures can enter into friendship 
with each other, but not with non-rational creatures:
Friendship cannot be had except with rational creatures, in whom there happens 
to be a mutual return of love and a sharing in the works of life, and for whom it 
happens that things occur well or badly, according to fortune and happiness; as 
also there is benevolence properly speaking towards them. Irrational creatures 
are not able to reach so far as to love God, nor as to share in the intellectual and 
happy life by which God lives. (ST I, q. 20, a. 2 and ad 3)28
24 See Berry 2009b, 88.
25 See Berry 2006, 18. See also Berry 1988, 45, where Berry speaks of subjects in terms of 
interiority. However, he never fully or coherently works out what he means by it.
26 See also Berry 2009b, 152: “…we need to reflect on earlier times, when the human commu-
nity was experienced within a universe of subjects to be communed with, not of objects to 
be exploited.”
27 Aquinas defines “person” as an individual substance possessing a rational nature; see 
ST I, q. 29, a. 1.
28 See also ST II–II, q. 25, a. 3. Berry endorses Aldo Leopold assertion that “a land ethic 
changes the role of Homo sapiens from a conqueror of the land-community to a plain 
member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for 
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Berry on the other hand laments that: “We no longer hear the voice 
of the rivers, the mountains, or the sea. The trees and meadows are no 
longer intimate modes of spirit presence. The world about us has become 
an ‘it’ rather than a ‘thou’” (Berry 2000, 17). Berry calls us to commune 
with the earth29 and with bees and falcons.30 Berry roots this appeal in his 
understanding of unity of the parts of the universe: 
The other thing so important in this process is the relationship of origin. 
Everything in the universe is genetically cousin to everything else. There 
is literally one family, one bonding, in the universe, because everything is 
descended from the same universe, because everything is descended from the 
same source. … We are literally born as a community; the trees, the birds, and 
all living creatures are bonded together in a single community of life. (Berry 
1991, 14–15) 
Berry never distinguishes human communities which involve sharing the 
life of reason from non-human communities which do not. For him “we form 
a single sacred society with every other member of the Earth community, 
with the mountains and rivers…with all the creatures that move over the 
land…or swim through the sea” (Berry 2009b, 85). In addition, Berry never 
articulates a point of momentous importance for Aquinas, namely, that 
humans have been called by God to friendship with him. Our immaterial 
intellect renders us capable of being raised to share in God’s own life, 
something purely material beings are incapable of:31 
Therefore, it is manifest that from any love on the part of God follows some good 
caused in creatures; nevertheless sometimes not [a good] coeternal to his eternal 
the community as such” (Berry 2006, 36). For Aquinas, beavers and rocks may be parts of 
a land-community, but they cannot be citizens, except by metaphor, since they lack rea-
son. 
29 See Berry 1988, 97.
30 See Berry 2009b, 173. See Berry 1991, 71: “a person is carrying on a conversation with 
the trees or with the clouds or with the winds, that person is in contact with an ultimate 
power principle.” Aquinas would think it nonsense to talk to a tree; the beauty of a tree, 
and of creation in general, should lead us to talk to God. 
31 See ST I, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.
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love. And according to the difference of the sort of good is discerned a differing 
love of God for the creature. One [love] indeed is common, according to which 
“he loves all things that exist,” as is said in Wis. 11:25; namely, according as 
he bestows natural being on created things. Another love, however, is special, 
according to which he draws the rational creature above the condition of nature 
to a sharing in the divine good. And according to this love something is said 
to be loved simply speaking, because according to this love God wants simply 
speaking the eternal good that is himself for the creature. (ST I–II, q. 110, a. 1)
It is through grace that God “draws the rational creature above the con-
dition of nature.” 32 Thus, for Aquinas, humans are capable of union with 
God through grace (and ultimately through glory), as well as of union with 
other rational beings who are united with God, which he refers to as the 
communion of saints.33 Berry speaks of none of these things, and indeed 
finds the notion that humans alone belong to the spiritual community to be 
problematic, in keeping with his denial of a discontinuity between humans 
and other earthly creatures.34 
5. What is sacred and to be revered?
For Aquinas, the words “sacred” and “holy” (“sacer” and “sanctus”35 respec-
tively) are more or less synonyms. Aquinas says the following about holiness:
Since the good loved has the notion of an end, and the motion of the will is 
rendered good or bad from the end, thus it is necessary that the love by which the 
highest good is loved, which is God, obtain a certain eminent goodness, which 
32 See STh I–II, q. 110, a. 2. Berry has a very different concept of grace. For him “a moment of 
grace” is on at which “great transformations of the universe occur,” e.g., when life began 
on earth; see Berry 2000, c. 17, “Moments of Grace,” 197–201.
33 See In Symbolum Apostolorum, a. 10.
34 See Berry 2006, 51: “The continuity between the human community and the natural world 
was altered by identifying the human as a spiritual being in contrast to all other beings. 
Only the human really belonged to the sacred community of the redeemed.”
35 Both “sacer” and “sanctus” have the same root: “SA, whence sancio, sanus, Gr. sáos” 
(Marchant 1953); sancio means “to make sacred or inviolable by a religious act” (ibid.) 
and sáos means “safe.”
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is expressed by the name of holiness (sanctitatis), for according to the Greeks 
“holy”36 means, as it were, “pure,” for the purest goodness, immune from any 
defect, is in God; or according to Latin speakers, what is called “holy” is “firm,” 
for unchangeable goodness is in God, on account of which all things that are 
ordained to God are called holy (sancta), such as the temple and the vessels of 
the temple, and all things that have been handed over for divine worship. It is 
therefore fitting that the spirit by which the love with which God loves himself 
is introduced in us is called the Holy Spirit. (Compendium theologiae, I, c. 47)37 
The word “holy” in both Greek and Latin first had reference to persons and 
things devoted or consecrated to God, and then was transferred to name 
God’s perfect and unchanging goodness; it is to the latter that the name 
most properly applies, the holiness of things consecrated to God possessing 
a derivative form of holiness. Human beings in the state grace can also be 
called “holy” because they are made so by divine indwelling.38 While Aquinas 
holds that God is present to all creatures, sustaining them in existence, he 
denies that this presence makes the creatures themselves divine. It is only 
God’s presence in certain rational creatures through grace and glory that 
results in their divinization.39 
Aquinas maintains that reverence consists in desiring to show attentive 
service to the one who is revered and in fearing to do anything that might 
offend him. For Aquinas, God is the primary object of reverence,40 and the 
reverence that is to be shown to God alone, has a special name, “latria.” 41 
Creatures created in the image of God who remain open to God42 are also 
rightfully shown reverence, though of a lesser form: “Dulia conveys the 
reverence and honor that can be shown to a creature. Since, however, honor 
36 The Greek equivalent of the Latin “sacer,” is “hagios” which means “devoted to the gods, 
pious, pure” (Liddell 1948).
37 Compare to ST II–II, q. 99 a. 1 where Aquinas uses the word “sacrum” in place of “sanc-
tum.”
38 See Compendium theologiae, I, c. 47. 
39 See ST I, q. 12, a. 5, ad 3 and II Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.
40 See ST II–II, q. 121, a.1 ad 3 and ST II–II, q. 81, a. 2.
41 See ST II–II, q. 81, a. 4, ad 3 and ST II–II, q. 103, a. 3.
42 Fallen angels are intelligent beings who are incapable of loving God, and so are not to be 
revered; see III Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5.
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is not owed except to divine things, as the Philosopher says in Bk. I of the 
Ethics, it is not owed properly and directly except to the one possessing grace 
and virtue which makes [one] divine” (III Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 3).
Living human beings who are bad people are not to be revered as the 
individuals they are, but only to the extent that they have a human nature 
which makes them capable of becoming virtuous.43 As for non-rational 
creatures, no reverence is owed them because they are not themselves 
divine; they are incapable of acquiring virtue44 (as they lack free will) and 
they cannot be recipients of grace.45 
Berry, unlike Aquinas, does not attribute sacredness primarily to God: 
“The universe is the primary sacred reality” (Berry 2000, 49). Berry seems 
to realize that if God is a separate being from creation, there would be no 
reason to claim that natural things themselves are sacred. For this reason, 
he criticizes the notion of divine transcendence:
How and why did our present devastation of the Earth happen? …The first 
thing that makes us vulnerable is a transcendent, personal, monotheistic creative 
deity. The constellation of the divine in a personal transcendent order tends to 
desacralize the phenomenal world. (Berry 2006, 25)46 
 [The notion of a transcendent deity has] led us to treat the phenomenal world 
with something less than the reverence paid it by those cultures in which there 
is a sacred dimension to trees, to rivers, and to the whole of creation. (Berry 
2006, 25) 
43 See III Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 3. 
44 See III Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 3, ad 6 : “Dulia [the type of reverence which can be shown to 
a creature] is not owed the likeness of a vestige, as it is owed the likeness of an image, 
because it has no aptitude for virtue.”
45 See ST I–II, q. 110, a. 2. 
46 See also, Berry 1991, 114: “The divine, once perceived as a pervasive divine presence 
throughout the phenomenal world, was constellated in the Bible in a transcendent, mon-
otheistic deity, a creator of the world…. But what is more important is that we appear to 
give up that primordial, inherent relationship between the human and the divine within 
the natural order of things….. The Genesis creation narrative states that each part of 
creation is good. At the end of the narrative, it is declared ‘very good.’ But this is different 
from having a sacred natural world with an all-pervasive divine presence. This is the con-
text of desacralization that we have.” See also, Berry 2006, 51. 
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Berry wants the divine and the sacred to reside in the universe itself. 
He affirms that: “Every existence is a mode of divine presence” (Berry 1991, 
19).47 Here he differs radically from Aquinas, who maintains: “each thing is 
said to be good by divine goodness, as a first principle, exemplar, efficient 
cause, and final cause of all goodness. Nevertheless each thing is called 
good by a likeness of divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its own 
goodness denominating itself” (ST I, q. 6, a. 4; emphasis added). 
This passage speaks in terms of goodness. However, for Aquinas being 
is convertible with goodness,48 so similarly each being formally has its own 
being. Thus, for Aquinas no created substance is a “mode of divine presence.” 
Aquinas thinks that God must always be present to created things if they are 
to exist. However, he further holds: “Nevertheless it is not to be thought that 
he [God] is in things as if mixed in them, for it has been shown that neither 
matter nor form is [something] of him, but he is in his works through the 
mode of an agent cause” (ScG III, c. 68). God is in created things in the mode 
of an agent cause of their existence, but their existence is not a “mode of 
divine existence,” but something that belongs to them as beings other than 
God. God is separate from the world, but not separated from it; God’s very 
transcendence as Creator goes hand-in-hand with him being intimately 
present to creatures.49 God’s presence to non-rational creatures does not 
make the creatures themselves divine.
Berry thinks that the only way to get humans to cease treating natural 
things as pure instruments is to get them to see natural things as sacred and 
to be revered; in order to secure this vision, Berry, again, locates divinity in 
creatures themselves and not in a God transcending them. Accordingly, Berry 
often conflates the universe with God. Especially in his later works, Berry 
attributes to the universe what Aquinas sees as belonging properly to God. 
For instance, Berry affirms that the universe is “the ultimate self-referent 
47 See also, Berry 2009a, 86 where Berry approvingly quotes Scotus Eriugena: “It follows that 
we ought not to understand God and the creature as two things distinct from one another, 
but as one and the same.” See also, ibid., 92.
48 See ST I, q. 5, a. 1: “good and being are the same in reality (secundum re), and only differ 
according to reason.”
49 See ST I, q. 8, a. 1.
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mode of being in the phenomenal world” and for this reason “it constitutes 
the norm of all reality and value” (Berry 2006, 23).50 For Aquinas, the universe 
is a universe of creatures, and creatures have a necessary reference to the 
Creator who while present to all of them is not part of them. Therefore, noth-
ing in the phenomenal world, even the entire universe itself, is self-referent. 
God alone has no necessary relation to anything outside himself.51 Aquinas 
also maintains that what is good and bad in human action is determined 
according to natural law.52 Natural law, however, is derived from God’s 
eternal law,53 and not simply from nature or the universe. 
As Berry and Aquinas disagree as to what is sacred and divine, they 
accordingly also disagree as to what should be reverenced. Berry maintains: 
As heirs to the biblical tradition, we believed that the planet belonged to us. 
… We still do not feel …that we should revere every living creature—from the 
lowliest insect to the great eagle in the sky. We fail to recognize our obligation 
to bow before the majesty of the mountains and rivers, the forests, the grassland, 
the deserts, the coastlands. (Berry 2009b, 173)
Given Berry’s position concerning the sacredness of creatures, it is not 
surprising he expresses puzzlement regarding idolatry: “Why were the 
pagans seen as idolatrous? The divine always appears in some embodiment; 
no one ever worshiped matter as matter” (Berry 1991, 19). Aquinas, while 
not holding that people worshiped matter insofar as it is a principle of 
change and corruption, holds that some worshiped material beings because 
of perfections they possess, such as beauty or power:
A third reason [for idolatry] is on account of ignorance of the true God whose 
excellence men were not considering; and they gave divine worship to certain 
50 See also, Berry 2009b, 138: “In the phenomenal world, only the universe is self-referent.” 
51 See ST I, q. 13, a. 7: “Therefore, since God is outside the whole order of the creature, and 
all creatures are ordered to him, and not vice versa, it is manifest that creatures are really 
referred to God himself; but in God there is no some real relation to creatures, but only in 
reason, insofar as creatures are referred to him.” 
52 See ST I–II, q. 94. a. 3.
53 See ibid.
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creatures on account of their beauty or power. Whence it is said in the book of 
Wisdom, “people, while applying their minds to the works, failed to acknowledge 
who the Artificer was, and they thought rather that fire or wind or the swift air 
or the circuit of the stars or the immense body of water or the sun or the moon 
were the gods that were rulers of the earth. (ST II–II, q. 94, a. 4) 
In other words, these idolaters took God’s works for divine beings, when in-
stead, by reflection on these works, they should have come to know God, the 
Artificer. Accordingly, what Berry praises here, Aquinas regards as idolatry: 
With regard to time and season, rituals were established to create a conscious-
ness of the moments of cosmological change: the dawn and dusk of the daily 
sequence of sunlight and dark, the increase and decline in the phases of the 
moon, the winter solstice…. These moments of change were the moments when 
the shining forth of the phenomenal world was most evident. Such moments 
were moments of grace, moments when the sacred world communicated itself 
with special clarity to the world of the human.
This intimacy with the universe can be seen in the initiation ceremony of 
the Omaha Indians. When an infant is born, the child is taken out under the 
invocation ‘O Ye Sun, Moon, Stars, All Ye that move in the heavens, I bid you 
hear me. Into your midst has come a new life. Consent Ye, we implore, make its 
path smooth that it may move beyond the first hill.’ (Berry 2006, 115)54
For Aquinas, non-rational creatures themselves are not to be honored or 
revered; rather our consideration of them is meant to lead us to know and 
to revere God.55 Berry rarely mentions God,56 and generally does not speak 
of natural things as apt to lead our minds and hearts to God. Berry far more 
frequently speaks of natural things as things that we should be communing 
54 The same thought is also articulated in Berry 1991, 48 and in Berry 1988, 13–14 and 131. 
See also Berry 2009b, 171 and 176 for other instances of what Berry praises, but Aquinas 
would regard as idolatry.
55 See ScG, Bk. II, c. 2. 
56 Now and again, and especially in Berry’s earlier works, he does make reference to God, al-
beit rarely using the word “God.” For example, Berry says in his earlier work: “We bear the 
universe in our being as the universe bears us in its being. The two have a total presence to 
each other and to that deeper mystery out of which both the universe and ourselves have 
emerged” (Berry 1988, 132). See also, Berry 2009a, 64.
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with individually and as a way of connecting with the universe as ultimate 
sacred community. Again, the two thinkers plainly differ as to what they 
regard as primarily sacred; for Aquinas it is God, whereas for Berry, it is the 
universe. They also differ as to what makes humans holy; for Aquinas it is 
due to God dwelling in them through grace, whereas for Berry: “The earth 
is a very special sacred community. Humans become sacred by participating 
in this larger sacred community. … We must be integrated into the religious 
dimension of the earth” (Berry 1991, 43).57 For Aquinas, what is divine and 
to be revered is God and rational beings open to God, whereas for Berry it 
is the natural things that make up the sacred community of the universe. 
6. What is the story we need to know
According to Berry, the story that modern people above all need to know is 
the story of the development of the natural world:
If this sense of the sacred character of the natural world as our primary revelation 
of the divine is our first need, our second need is to diminish our emphasis on 
redemption experience in favor of greater emphasis on creation processes. 
Creation, however, must now be experienced as the emergence of the universe 
as a psychic-spiritual as well as a material-physical reality from the beginning. 
We need to see ourselves as integral with the emergent process as that being in 
whom the universe reflects on and celebrates itself. (Berry 1988, 81)58
Aquinas maintains that the story we need to know is the Gospel. The reason 
for this is that Aquinas holds that human beings, as rational animals, have 
as their ultimate end knowledge of God. Eternal life does not consist in 
knowledge of creation, but in “knowing the one true God and Jesus Christ 
57 Berry goes on to say: “we have in the Christian tradition the idea that the church is the 
sacred community, and that parishes are sacred communities—as indeed they are” (Berry 
1991, 43). He never explains what makes the church a sacred community, and why there is 
a further need for people to be integrated into the sacred community of the earth in order 
to be sacred. See also, Berry 1988, 257 and Berry 2000, 49.
58 See also, Berry 1988, 25. 
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whom he sent” (Jn. 17.3).59 Aquinas holds that “faith is the habit of mind by 
which eternal life begins in us, making the intellect assent to things that 
are not apparent” (Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos, c. 11, lec. 1). By faith the 
Christian believes the truths of the Creed, one of the most central of which 
is the Redemption. Aquinas would thus disagree with Berry’s view that we 
need to “diminish our emphasis on redemption experience in favor of greater 
emphasis on creation processes” (Berry 1988, 81).60 Aquinas resoundingly 
agrees with Peter’s words to Christ: “To whom, Lord, shall we go? You have 
the words of eternal life” (Jn. 6:68). 
Aquinas does agree up to a point with Berry that we should not neglect 
a consideration of material creatures. He maintains that “the consideration 
of creatures is useful for instruction in the faith,” and “in a certain manner 
meditation on things divinely made…is necessary” (ScG II, c. 2). As noted 
earlier, Aquinas affirms the role of creation in leading our minds to God and 
our hearts to reverence of God, and he does so frequently.61 He speaks of 
creation as “a certain book in which knowledge of God can be read” (Super 
Romanos, c. 1, lec. 6).62 And as Berry approvingly notes, 63 Aquinas maintains 
that “knowledge of creatures is valuable for destroying errors concerning 
God” (ScG II, c. 3).64 
Aquinas, however, is not advocating an in-depth study of creatures, 
but rather a general knowledge of creatures sufficient to avoid errors 
59 See Super Ioannem, c. 17, lec. 1, no. 3. 
60 See also, Berry 1991, 75, “I sometime think we worry too much about Jesus Christ. We 
have, to my mind, been overly concerned with salvation and the savior personality.”
61 See ST I, q. 2, a.2 and ScG I, c. 12.
62 Aquinas would agree with Berry that modern man’s tendency to ignore the book of na-
ture is problematic. As Berry puts it: “We live in cities, in a world of concrete and steel, 
of wheels and wires, a world of unending work. We seldom see the stars at night or the 
planets or the moon. … Ours is a world of highways, parking lots, shopping centers. … We 
no longer read the Book of Nature” (Berry 2000, 15).
63 See Berry 2009b, 7.
64 See ScG II, c. 3: “In this manner, therefore, it is manifest that the opinion of certain people 
who were saying that it in nowise matters to the faith what someone might think about 
creatures, so long as they thought rightly about God…for error concerning creatures flows 
over into false knowledge of God, when it subjects them to certain other causes, and it 
leads the minds of men away from God, whom the faith strive to direct them to.” 
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that would lead one away from the faith. The specific errors he names are 
found on the part of “those who think that any body is God,” as is the case 
of those who think that things such as fire or the sun or stars are gods; 
secondly, those who “attribute the creation of things to causes other than 
God;” thirdly, “those who detract some things from the divine power that 
operates in creatures, as for example…do those who subtract some or all 
things from Divine Providence; lastly, those who due to ignorance of the 
natures of things, “are consequently ignorant of their rank in the order of 
the universe, and think themselves to be subject to other creatures to which 
they are superior, as is the case of those who believe that the will of men 
is subject to the stars” (ScG II, c. 3). (Aquinas would see Berry as guilty of 
a couple of these misunderstandings.) 
Aquinas goes on to say that there are many truths about creatures which 
are of no concern to the religious believer:
What the philosopher considers about creatures is otherwise than what the 
theologian does. For the philosopher considers those things which belong to 
them according to their proper nature, such as that fire is born upward; the 
faith, however, considers only those things about creatures which belongs to 
them according as they are related to God, such as that they are created by 
God, that they are subject to God, and things of this sort. Whence it is not to 
be imputed to some imperfection of the doctrine of the faith, if it sets aside 
many properties of things, such as the structure of the heavens, the quality of 
motion.... (ScG II, c. 4)
Thus, for Aquinas, while the faithful need to have a sufficient knowledge of 
creatures to steer clear of astrology and other forms of idolatry, the knowl-
edge of the details of natural causality which is proper to science is generally 
of no importance to them as believers. Berry, to the contrary, laments that: 
“Until recently, there has been a feeling in most religious traditions that 
spiritual persons were not concerned with any detailed understanding of the 
biological order of Earth” (Berry 2009b, 136). For him the “universe story” 
is the detailed story of the development of the universe as presented by 
science. He thinks that this story is of such overarching importance that:
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Our scientific understanding of the universe becomes a wisdom tradition. We 
will finally appreciate that our new understanding of a universe that comes 
into being through a sequence of irreversible transformations has a revelatory 
dimension. This fresh understanding of the universe establishes a horizon under 
which all the traditions will hence forth need to function in their integral mode 
of self understanding. (Berry 2009b, 136–37) 
Elsewhere Berry affirms: “We live in a world of irreversible, emergent process. 
If Christianity is to survive in any effective manner, it must bring about 
a reinterpretation of all its teachings within this context” (Berry 1991, 74). 
The reason why Berry thinks that the story of the universe as science 
tells it is so important is because it reveals a universe in which things are 
far more connected than previously thought. While indigenous peoples had 
a mystical sense of connection with the universe, science gives us a rational 
understanding of our connectedness to the universe. The earth is no longer 
a stage on which humans are placed, but something from which they have 
evolved. The earth is not something that was created ex nihilo and placed in 
the universe, but is the product of developmental processes in the universe. 
Our existence is dependent not only on water, air, and other things that 
presently exist on earth; our existence is dependent on processes that 
occurred in the past, such as the formation of heavy elements in the stars. 
Berry sees as a crucial deficiency in the Christian worldview the failure to 
“present the world as a continuing process of emergence in which there 
is an inner organic bond of descent of each reality from an earlier reality” 
(Berry 1988, 129). It is the discontinuity between humans and the rest of 
the universe, affirmed by Aquinas, that Berry ultimately has in his sights: 
“Empirical inquiry into the universe reveals that from its beginning in the 
galactic system to its earthly expression in human consciousness the uni-
verse carries within itself a psychic-spiritual as well as a physical-material 
dimension. Otherwise human consciousness emerges out of nowhere” 
(Berry 1988, 131).65
65 See also, Berry 2000, 192: “Because this story is a single story and the components of the 
universe are so intimately related, the story must account for human intelligence. If we 
consider that human intelligence is a psychic faculty, then the universe from the begin-
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Aquinas would not see the new story of the universe as changing 
anything that is essential to the faith. God remains the Creator, who brings 
things into existence ex nihilo and who sustains all things in existence, 
and the Governor, moving all things to their ends. Christ remains the 
Redeemer. And no other article of the Creed would change. Moreover, 
although Aquinas lacked familiarity with the scientific method and with 
the scientific discoveries Berry has access to, he had already entertained 
the notion of a developmental universe, e.g., in examining the line in 
Genesis: “the earth put forth green plants” (ST I, q. 69, a. 2). He did not see 
the notion of a developing universe to require revision of any central truth 
of the faith. In addition, although Aquinas was unaware of the scientific 
account of the interconnection of the parts of the universe in both time and 
space, he maintains in many places that the parts of the universe form an 
interactive whole, ordered to God’s glory.66 While he would be glad to learn 
of the details of the interconnection of the universe’s parts, it would not 
change his basic views on the unity of the universe, human discontinuity 
with other material beings, and God as Creator. 
Aquinas acknowledges that certain specific interpretations of Scripture 
may need to be revisited in the light of new scientific knowledge that is 
well-established:
Whether the firmament was made on the second day? In questions of this 
sort two things are to be observed, as Augustine teaches. First, that the truth 
of Scripture is held as unshakable. Secondly, since the divine Scripture can be 
expounded in many ways, no one should inhere so decidedly to any exposition 
such that if it was established to be false by a reason that was certain, he would 
presume to assert that it was the meaning of Scripture; lest from his assertion 
ning must be a psychic-producing process.” Scheid thinks that Berry follows in Aquinas’s 
footsteps by harmonizing faith with the scientia of his day (see Scheid 2011, 144). When it 
comes to the production of the human being, Aquinas would hold that Berry is not incor-
porating the science of his day into his understanding of the faith, but rather is engaging 
in scientism.
66 See In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Bk. 12, lec. 12 and ST I, q. 103, 
a. 4, ad 1.
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Scripture be derided by unbelievers and lest it block for them the way to believing. 
(ST I, q. 68, a. 1)
But again, Aquinas would deny that any needed reinterpretations of specific 
Scripture passages would affect the essentials of the faith, as they do not alter 
the fundamental relationship of creatures to their Creator and Redeemer.
Conclusion
Berry’s works are liberally sprinkled with references to Aquinas, and the two 
hold a number of important views in common: 1) non-rational creatures 
have their own inherent goodness; 2) they are not just instruments at the 
service of humankind; 3) they and we are parts of a universe which reflects 
God in a more perfect way than if rational creatures alone made up the 
universe; 4) errors about the natural world can lead to errors about God. 
This gives the impression that Berry is a Thomist.
Further scrutiny, however, shows that the two part ways on crucial points. 
Berry wants the divine and the sacred to reside in the universe and in all 
the beings that constitute it, for he thinks that otherwise there would be no 
reason for us to care for non-rational creatures. Consequently, he regards 
the notion of a transcendent God that situates holiness in God, but not in 
the universe at large, to lead to the exploitation of creation. For him every 
being is sacred, and humans are not more or less so than other creatures, 
and so every being is owed reverence. 
Aquinas, to the contrary, maintains God’s transcendence which embraces 
God’s unique ability to create ex nihilo and to sustain things in being; God 
is thus present to all creatures, without being part of them. Aquinas also 
holds that holiness belongs first and foremost to God who is wholly good, 
and then to rational creatures open to God, as these are created in the image 
of God, possessing as they do the immaterial faculties of intellect and free 
will. These latter creatures’ goodness goes beyond their being and natural 
acts, because in virtue of possessing free will they are capable of additional 
forms of goodness, namely, virtue and grace. Accordingly, God and rational 
beings are holy and worthy of reverence, whereas non-rational beings are not. 
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Berry maintains that the universe is psycho-spiritual reality sufficient 
unto itself to bring human individuals into existence. He never refers to 
humans as the only creatures on earth created in the image of God. Berry 
regards any acknowledgement that humans are in some sense discontinuous 
with the rest of creation to justify our treating creation any way we please.
Aquinas, on the other hand, holds that God alone can produce the 
immaterial human soul. For Aquinas, the discontinuity and superiority of 
rational creatures over non-rational ones that accrues to them due to their 
immaterial soul both justifies human use of non-rational creatures and 
grounds a moral imperative to care for them.
Aquinas and Berry both agree that the universe as a whole is a greater 
good than any part of the universe. However, Aquinas attributes a primacy 
to the role of humans in the universe, one which Berry denies. Aquinas 
affirms that: “In the good of the universe, as what is principal, is the rational 
nature contained therein, which nature has the capacity for beatitude, [and] 
to which all other creatures are ordered; and according to this it belongs 
to God and to us to love with charity in the highest degree the good of the 
universe” (De Virtutibus, q. 2, a. 7, ad 5).
Aquinas accordingly sees the communion of saints, those who share 
in the divine good, as being the sacred community. And he thinks that the 
story people need to hear is the gospel, as this story is above all others 
conducive to entry into this sacred community. Although Aquinas sees it 
to be beneficial to gain knowledge of God through the book of nature, and 
indeed see certain errors concerning creatures as harmful to religious belief, 
for him, it is the words of the Incarnate Word that are first and foremost 
the words of eternal life.
Berry denies that the friendship of man with God and other persons 
united to God constitute the sacred community, holding rather that the 
universe is the sacred community. He thinks we should be communing with 
the powers of the non-human world around us, something that Aquinas 
regards as idolatry. Berry maintains that the story we need to hear is of 
the universe as told by science, since he thinks it supports his thesis of the 
absence of discontinuities in the universe. He recommends that “we might 
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give up the Bible for awhile, put it on the shelf for perhaps twenty years. 
… Excessive concern with the historical Christ is presently just not that 
helpful” (Berry 1991, 75). 
We have seen, then, that Berry’s thought diverges from Aquinas’s in 
numerous and significant ways. Thus, Berry, despite sharing a number of 
Aquinas’s views, cannot rightly be considered a Thomist. Those who seek 
to formulate a sound environmental ethics do well to carefully examine the 
issues where these two thinkers part ways.
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